non-combatants were involved in a variety of roles for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, both voluntarily and forcibly. Russian Germans, an ethnic minority residing in the Eastern region of the USSR, had had an inconspicuous presence in Russia since the 18th century.
2 During World War II, however, suspicion of their support for the Nazis led to their deportation to various parts of the Soviet Union. After the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941, many more Soviet citizens fell under the authority of the Nazis. Treatment of these Soviets depended on what they had to offer for the German war effort, but Nazi racial ideology led to little consideration for Soviet lives that were not aiding the Germans.
Russian/Soviet German Treatment
In Russia, the ethnic German minority enjoyed more freedom and opportunity than the vast majority of Russians. Approximately 25,000 Germans came to Russia as a result of Katherine the Great's 1763 Manifesto, which promised a plethora of social, religious, and economic benefits to foreigners who agreed to reside in the Russia and support the country's economic development. Until 1861, the Germans were a small group of free people in a nat 3 ion of serfs. While many lived "the most modest of lives" as small-scale farmers, the provisions granted to the Germans under the Manifesto created many successful farmers and factory 2 Note that in this paper, both 'Russian Germans' and 'Soviet Germans' (abbreviated SG) will refer to the same population of ethnic Germans who lived in Russia. The former will be used for the pre-1917 period, and the latter for the post-1917 period. In cases where ethnic Germans in Russia are referred to across both time periods, they will be called "Russian/Soviet Germans," for purposes of clarity.
3 Rogovin Frankel, The Soviet Germans: Past and Present, (London: Hurst, 1986 ), 2-3; Catherine II, Manifesto of 1763, Translated Copy, From Norka, Colony History Collection, https://www.norkarussia.info/catherines-manifesto-1763.html, (Accessed February 16th, 2019) 3 Pinkus, Fleischhauer, The Soviet Germans, [4] [5] owners. 5 The German settlers had almost a century to establish themselves as private landowners before the majority of Russian citizens had this opportunity with the abolishment of serfdom.
Just like the Tsarist government before them, the Soviet authorities did not interfere in the areas of SG identity that were not in disagreement with any of their ideological goals. The authorities gave SGs the freedom to express themselves, insofar as they did not venture into political dissent. Record keeping in the Volga region was recorded in both German and Russian. propaganda tool paired with Stalin's desire for harvest collection were the true reasons they were not deported earlier. 13 This implies that the wholesale deportation was most probably a preventative measure instead of a retaliatory one; if their truly was a resistance movement, collection of the harvest would not be prioritized over deportation.
The deportation of the SGs can be characterized as "prophylactic" in the sense that the displacement was instituted not to punish individuals (or groups) for crimes that had already been committed, but was instead instituted to deport people "who would presumably commit an offense if given the opportunity." 14 In typical Soviet fashion, justification for the forced displacement in public declarations was either heavily exaggerated or entirely fabricated.
According to the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR, "On the Resettlement of Germans
Residing in the Volga Region," military authorities had "reliable facts" that led them to conclude that "tens of thousands of diversionists and spies, who, at a signal given from Germany, must commit sabotage in the districts which are populated by the Germans in the Volga Region." 15 In order to "prevent acts of sabotage and bloodshed," the SGs would be deported to the "arable land" of eastern Russia, as well as Kazakhstan. 16 In the years since, no evidence of widespread collaboration directly with the German government has been found. As per the decree, the deportation from the Volga area was completed on schedule, and was followed by several other decrees initiating the deportations of SGs from other regions, such as Crimea. Later deportations would bring the total amount of displaced Germans to 905,000. In their new locations, the Germans were grouped into labor "armies" meant to support the war effort. The laborers received labor camp food rations and followed work schedules comparable to those sentenced to the Gulags. Those who were too young, old, or ill for hard work were left with little food on collective farms. 18 The penalty for attempting to escape one's designated place of labor was 20 years in prison. 19 Hence, by ridding the front of potential collaborators while simultaneously providing a forced labor resource for the war effort, the tactic of deportation served as a panacea for the Soviet authority.
In some instances, however, SGs experienced even harsher persecution as a result of their ethnicity. In her memoir, Ella Schneider Hilton recounts how her father was taken by the Soviet secret police force (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, or NKVD) along with other SG men soon after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, before anyone in their predominantly SG village even knew about Operation Barbarossa. After the men were shot in the town square, the SG women began "searching for their fathers, husbands, and sons. [Hilton's mother] had turned over one bullet-riddled body after another, into the hundreds. All were cold and stiff." 20 It appears that this tragic event occurred as an act of anger and retaliation by a local NKVD force and was not part of a systemic policy instituted by the national government, but it nonetheless remains a part of the SG experience of Hilton's village, and possibly of others like it.
These drastic variations in treatment can be explained if they are considered in the context of the USSR being a socialist country in a state of war. The quick enactment of policies against the kulak class in the years after the October Revolution, as well as collectivization initiatives and five year industrialization plans all had the characteristic of being rapid solutions 18 Ibid. to systemic "problems." In the context of nationality policy during WWII, whether it was the decision to remove entire SG communities by Stalin, or the decision to execute the SG men in one village by the local NKVD, the treatment of the SGs bore the sign of a typical Soviet response to suspicion--swift eradication of a perceived source of trouble. Similar deportations of other ethnic minorities on grounds of suspicion support this characterization.
While the authorities framed the deportations as a preventative measure meant to stop the "tens of thousands" of collaborationists amongst the German populace, those who had close ties to the minority but were not a part of it did not receive any punishment. In the NKVD instruction for resettling the Volga Germans, German wives married to non-Germans were not deported.
Likewise, the Russian wives of German husbands did not have to leave their homes, but could "choose to follow [their] husband voluntarily." 21 Thus, the incriminating factor of the ethnic Germans was two-fold. First, it was race-based. Even if Russian women lived alongside SGs, they were not subject to deportation simply because they were not ethnically of German descent.
Second, the displacement policy implied that the likelihood of being a "diversionist" depended on gender. German women married to Russian men were exempt, thereby suggesting that they were less likely than their male counterparts to engage in anti-regime activity because of their marriage to Russian men. However, given that the majority of SG settlements were isolated, the number of instances in which the gender based policy led to exemptions must have been minuscule.
As a result of their ethnicity, the onset of wartime worsened conditions for virtually all proceed with the forced displacement. While their families were being sent to Siberia and Kazakhstan, the troop--already integrated into regiments and stationed at the Eastern front--were exempt from relocation. Nine SG troops were even awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union medal, the highest honor bestowed on soldiers. 22 Thus, the overarching policy against the SG population in the wartime period involved extensive deportation and hard labor, paired with episodic accounts of executions and exemptions. Fueled by racial discrimination, the policies would alter the lives of the SGs in the post-war period, as they would be bound to designated zones for decades before incrementally regaining their rights as citizens of the USSR. The ethnological nature at the root of the decisions made by the Soviet leadership reflects the stark disparity between the heavily lauded socialist values of equality and the actual treatment of ethnic minorities.
Soviets in Nazi-occupied Territory
On the Eastern front, Hitler's armies conquered a vast span of territory in a matter of weeks, placing millions of Soviet citizens under the jurisdiction of the Nazis. Official policy towards the noncombatants was-much like Stalin's policies in regard to SGs-race-based.
However, the endpoint for Nazi racial law was not forced displacement and hard labor, but death.
Originally, Jewish Soviet citizens were executed by the SS-Einsatzgruppen (SS- Taskforces When considered collectively, these accounts reveal the complexity of the Soviet civilian experience under Nazi occupation. The many factors that determined the treatment of the Soviet noncombatants led to a broad range of experiences. While guidelines on treatment of civilians existed, the racial hatred that was a key aspect of German fascism actively encouraged violation of these norms. In other cases, the natural interaction amongst troops and Soviet noncombatants led to the development of friendship, as evidenced by the relationship between Katya and the troops who lived in her home. However, it is clear that during WWII, Soviet citizens could expect death much more often than they could expect decent treatment by German authorities. 
Soviet Germans and Soviets in

Conclusion
Involving millions of people, the policies instituted by the USSR and Germany towards foreign civilians led to an incredibly broad range of experiences. These experiences need to be studied alongside one another so that both sides can be better understood. Historians have long compared the Soviet and Nazi regimes for their totalitarian nature, but studying ethnic minorities during the Second World War would not be complete without an understanding of the situations these groups found themselves in as a result of their identity. Of course, some exceptions to cruel treatment naturally resulted from the amiable encounters between Wehrmacht troops and civilians, but the war time period was mostly damaging and deadly for the Soviets who lived under Nazi occupation. It was only under oversight from the Allies that negative racial attitudes were suppressed and Soviets living in DP camps could lead lives without major persecution.
For the Soviet Union, the policies of collectivization and kulak eradication laid the framework for the massive campaigns of deportation. Years later, the complete reversal of opinion on the treatment of SGs by Nikita Khrushchev very publicly illuminated the mistakes of 50 Ibid., 93. 51 Ibid., 108. Soviet leadership during the war. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that this information went public 23 years after the deportation orders affirmed the lack of accountability inherent in the Soviet system of governance. Some historians have argued that maybe the most important long term result of Stalin's deportation was perceptual: With the highly publicized plight of ethnic minorities during the Gorbachev era, it contributed to the idea that the USSR was an empire, and based on historical precedent, empires were supposed to collapse. 
